Из главы Social Intelligence by John F. Kihlstrom and Nancy Cantor:
"The George Washington Social Intelligence Test
The first of these was the George Washington Social Intelligence Test, (GWSIT; Hunt, 1928; Moss, 1931; Moss, Hunt, Omwake, & Ronning, 1927; for later editions, see Moss, Hunt, & Omwake, 1949; Moss, Hunt, Omwake, & Woodward, 1955). Like the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test or Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the GWSIT was composed of a number of subtests, which can be combined to yield an aggregate score. The subtests are:
Judgment in Social Situations;
Memory for Names and Faces;
Observation of Human Behavior;
Recognition of the Mental States Behind Words;
Recognition of Mental States from Facial Expression;
Social Information; and
Sense of Humor:
The first four subtests were employed in all editions of the GWSIT. The Facial Expression and Social Information subtests were dropped, and the Humor subtest added, in later editions.
Hunt (1928) originally validated the GWSIT through its correlations with adult occupational status, the number of extracurricular activities pursued by college students, and supervisor ratings of employees' ability to get along with people. However, some controversy ensued about whether social intelligence should be correlated with personality measures of sociability or extraversion (e.g., Strang, 1930; Thorndike & Stein, 1937). Most important, however, the GWSIT came under immediate criticism for its relatively high correlation with abstract intelligence
The inability to discriminate between the social intelligence and IQ, coupled with difficulties in selecting external criteria against which the scale could be validated, led to declining interest in the GWSIT, and indeed in the whole concept of social intelligence as a distinct intellectual entity.
After an initial burst of interest in the GWSIT, work on the assessment and correlates of social intelligence fell off sharply until the 1960s (Walker & Foley, 1973), when this line of research was revived within the context of Guilford's (1967) Structure of Intellect model. Guilford postulated a system of at least 120 separate intellectual abilities, based on all possible combinations of five categories of operations (cognition, memory, divergent production, convergent production, and evaluation), with four categories of content (figural, symbolic, semantic, and behavioral) and six categories of products (units, classes, relations, systems, transformations, and implications). Interestingly, Guilford considers his system to be an expansion of the tripartite classification of intelligence originally proposed by E.L. Thorndike. Thus, the symbolic and semantic content domains correspond to abstract intelligence, the figural domain to practical intelligence, and the behavioral domain to social intelligence.
Tests of the remaining three structure-of-intellect domains (memory, convergent production, and evaluation) had not developed by the time the Guilford program came to a close. Hendricks et al. (1969) noted that "these constitute by far the greatest number of unknowns in the [Structure of Intellect] model" (p. 6). However, O'Sullivan et al. (1965) did sketch out how these abilities were defined. Convergent production in the behavioral domain was defined as "doing the right thing at the right time" (p. 5), and presumably might be tested by a knowledge of etiquette. Behavioral memory was defined as the ability to remember the social characteristics of people (e.g., names, faces, and personality traits), while behavioral evaluation was defined as the ability to judge the appropriateness of behavior.
Social Intelligence as a Cognitive Module
An exception to the general rule that social intelligence plays little role in scientific theories of intelligence is the theory of multiple intelligences proposed by Gardner (1983, 1993). Unlike Spearman (1927), and other advocates of general intelligence (e.g., Jensen, 1998), Gardner has proposed that intelligence is not a unitary cognitive ability, but that there are seven (and perhaps more) quite different kinds of intelligence, each hypothetically dissociable from the others, and each hypothetically associated with a different brain system. While most of these proposed intelligences (linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, and bodily-kinesthetic) are "cognitive" abilities somewhat reminiscent of Thurstone's primary mental abilities, two are explicitly personal and social in nature. Gardner defines intrapersonal intelligence as the person's ability to gain access to his or her own internal emotional life, andinterpersonal intelligence as the individual's ability to notice and make distinctions among other individuals.
Although Gardner's (1983) multiple intelligences are individual-differences constructs, in which some people, or some groups, are assumed to have more of these abilities than others, Gardner does not rely on the traditional psychometric procedures -- scale construction, factor analysis, multitrait-multimethod matrices, external validity coefficients, etc. -- for documenting individual differences. Rather, his preferred method is a somewhat impressionistic analysis based on a convergence of signs provided by eight different lines of evidence.
Although social intelligence has proved difficult for psychometricians to operationalize, it does appear to play a major role in people's naive, intuitive concepts of intelligence. Following up on earlier work by Rosch (1978), Cantor (Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Cantor, Smith, French, & Mezzich, 1980), and Neisser (1979), Sternberg and his colleagues asked subjects to list the behaviors which they considered characteristic of intelligence, academic intelligence, everyday intelligence, and unintelligence; two additional groups of subjects rated each of 250 behaviors from the first list in terms of how "characteristic" each was of the ideal person possessing each of the three forms of intelligence (Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981). Factor analysis of ratings provided by laypeople yielded a factor of "social competence" in each context.
A similar study was performed by Kosmitzki and John (1993). Based largely on prior research by Orlik (1978), these investigators assembled a list of 18 features which make up people's implicit concept of social intelligence. When subjects were asked to rate how necessary each feature was to their own personal understanding of social intelligence, the following dimensions emerged as most central to the prototype:
Understands people's thoughts, feelings, and intentions well;
Is good at dealing with people;
Has extensive knowledge of rules and norms in human relations;
Is good at taking the perspective of other people;
Adapts well in social situations;
Is warm and caring; and
Is open to new experiences, ideas, and values.
In another part of the study, subjects were asked to rate someone they liked on each of these attributes. After statistically controlling for differential likability of the traits, a factor analysis yielded a clear dimension of social intelligence, defined by the attributes listed above. The remaining two factors were named social influence and social memory.
Personality as Social Intelligence
In contrast to the psychometric approaches reviewed above, the social intelligence view of personality (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987, 1989; Cantor & Fleeson, 1994; Cantor & Harlow, 1994; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1989; see also Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1982; Cantor & Zirkel, 1990; Snyder & Cantor, 1998) does not conceptualize social intelligence as a trait, or group of traits, on which individuals can be compared and ranked on a dimension from low to high. Rather, the social-intelligence view of personality begins with the assumption that social behavior is intelligent -- that it is mediated by cognitive processes of perception, memory, reasoning, and problem-solving, rather than being mediated by innate reflexes, conditioned responses, evolved genetic programs, and the like. Accordingly, the social intelligence view construes individual differences in social behavior -- the public manifestations of personality -- to be the product of individual differences in the knowledge which individuals bring to bear on their social interactions. Differences in social knowledge cause differences in social behavior, but it does not make sense to construct measures of social IQ. The important variable is not how much social intelligence the person has, but rather what social intelligence he or she possesses.
Although the social intelligence view of personality diverges from the psychometric approach to social intelligence on the matter of assessment, it agrees with some contemporary psychometric views that intelligence is context-specific. Thus, in Sternberg's (1985, 1988) triarchic theory, social intelligence is part of a larger repertoire of knowledge by which the person attempts to solve the practical problems encountered in the physical and social world. According to Cantor and Kihlstrom (1987), social intelligence is specifically geared to solving the problems of social life, and in particular managing the life tasks, current concerns (Klinger 1977) or personal projects (Little, 1989) which the person selects for him- or herself, or which other people impose on him or her from outside. Put another way, one's social intelligence cannot be evaluated in the abstract, but only with respect to the domains and contexts in which it is exhibited and the life tasks it is designed to serve. And even in this case, "adequacy" cannot be judged from the viewpoint of the external observer, but rather from the point of view of the subject whose life tasks are in play.
Life tasks provide an integrative unit of analysis for the analysis of the interaction between the person and the situation. They may be explicit or implicit, abstract or circumscribed, universal or unique, enduring or stage-specific, rare or commonplace, ill-defined or well-defined problems. Whatever their features, they give meaning to the individual's life, and serve to organize his or her daily activities. They are defined from the subjective point of view of the individual: they are the tasks which the person perceives him- or herself as "working on and devoting energy to solving during a specified period in life (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987, p. 168). First and foremost, life tasks are articulated by the individual as self-relevant, time-consuming, and meaningful. They provide a kind of organizing scheme for the individual's activities, and they are embedded in the individual's ongoing daily life. And they are responsive to the demands, structure, and constraints of the social environment in which the person lives. Life tasks are imposed on people, and the ways in which they are approached may be constrained by sociocultural factors. However, unlike the stage-structured views of Erikson (1950) and his popularizers (e.g., Levinson, 1978; Sheehy, 1976), the social-intelligence view of personality does not propose that everyone at a particular age is engaged in the same sorts of life tasks. Instead, periods of transition, where the person is entering into new institutions, are precisely those times where individual differences in life tasks become most apparent.
People often begin to comprehend the problem at hand by simulating a set of plausible outcomes, relating them to previous experiences stored in autobiographical memory. They also formulate specific plans for action, and monitor their progress toward the goal, taking special note of environmental factors which stand in the way, and determining whether the actual outcome meets their original expectations. Much of the cognitive activity in life-task problem solving involves forming causal attributions about outcomes, and in surveying autobiographical memory for hints about how things might have gone differently. Particularly compelling evidence of the intelligent nature of life task pursuit comes when, inevitably, plans go awry or some unforseen event frustrates progress. Then, the person will map out a new path toward the goal, or even choose a new goal compatible with a superordinate life task. Intelligence frees us from reflex, tropism, and instinct, in social life as in nonsocial domains."
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